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PIPE TOLLING AND STATUTES OF REPOSE IN
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
Catalina Ford*
“Statutes of limitation, which are found and approved in all systems
of enlightened jurisprudence, represent a pervasive legislative
judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to
defend within a specified period of time and that the right to be free
of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
1
them.”
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate entities are typically organized under two systems:
concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership. 2 The American
economic landscape is dominated by firms operating under dispersed
ownership systems.3 In typical dispersed ownership entities, ownership
and control are separate. 4 No single shareholder, or group of
shareholders, owns a majority of the firm’s shares, enabling them to
influence board actions.5 Consequently, dispersed ownership systems
are plagued by the collective action problem.6 It is difficult for various
shareholders, even institutional investors, to efficiently organize and
coalesce their votes.7 Since the interests of shareholders and the board
may differ, the implicit separation of ownership and control in a
dispersed ownership system fosters concerns for minority shareholders’
rights.8
2. See John C. Coffee Jr., Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and
the Enduring Tension Between “Lumpers” and “Splitters” 2 (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 144, 2010) [hereinafter Coffee, Lumpers and
Splitters], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532922.
3. In 2001, less than 3% of American companies exemplified a concentrated
ownership system. See id. at 2, n.1 (citing Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction to
THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca and Marco Brecht eds.) (2001));
see also Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just Measure of
Repose: The Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1547,
1554 (2011) [hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose] (advocating
for the abolishment of the discovery provision in the statute of limitations but
maintaining the statute of repose in securities class actions).
4. Coffee, Lumpers and Splitters, supra note 2, at 2 (“[T]here is instead a
‘separation of ownership and control’ with neither the directors nor the senior
executives typically holding significant blocks of the company’s stock and with share
ownership instead being dispersed among many institutional and retail shareholders.”
(citing ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)).
5. See id.; see also Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note
3, at 1554.
6. When shareholders are dispersed, “collective action problems undermine
shareholder incentives to become informed before voting . . . . Each shareholder will
know that if she expends the cost of making a better-informed vote, her vote will have
little impact on the outcome, so she might as well remain uninformed and save the
information costs.” Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 796 (2005).
7. See Coffee, Lumpers and Splitters, supra note 2, at 61–62.
8. See id. at 2–3; Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Corporate Governance
Index: Convergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulations 4
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Securities reform in the 1930s converted the securities industry
from a system of caveat emptor to one of caveat vendor. 9 These
legislative measures ensured that minority shareholder rights were not
trampled upon and attempted to bridge the gap between ownership and
control in dispersed ownership systems. 10 Passed in the wake of the
stock market crash of 1929, the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”)
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”)
(collectively the “Securities Acts”) aimed to cure deficiencies in
common law fraud practices by establishing higher standards of conduct
in the securities industry.11 The 1933 Act regulates the initial offering of
registered shares, while the 1934 Act regulates the secondary market.12
The 1934 Act provided for the creation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) to protect investors.13 The SEC has the power to
register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing
agencies, and oversee the nation’s securities self regulatory

(Tilburg Law & Econs. Center, Discussion Paper DP 2010-012), available at
http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-andresearchgroups/tilec/research/publications/Discussion-papers-1/2010/.
9. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1 (Kris Markarian eds.,
3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW].
10. For example, in 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission took steps to
enhance the information companies provide to their shareholders by requiring that
public companies registered under federal securities law make new or revised
disclosures to shareholders regarding director qualifications and skills, board leadership
structure and responsibilities, the board’s role in risk management, and diversity in the
director nomination process. See Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Shareholders
Need Robust Disclosure to Exercise Their Voting Rights as Investors and Owners (Feb.
20, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/
1365171492322#.Uu_EB5EeXeI; see also Martynova & Renneboog, supra note 8, at 7
(“In countries where widely-held companies prevail, the main function of corporate
governance regulation is to protect shareholders from being expropriated by the
management.”).
11. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012); Herman
& Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership
and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1, 80 (2001) (“[A]s liquid securities markets developed and
dispersed ownership became prevalent, a new political constituency developed that
desired legal rules capable of filling in the inevitable enforcement gaps that selfregulation left.”).
12. JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 301–02 (7th ed. 2008).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
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organizations for the sake of protecting investors, while maintaining a
fair and efficient market and facilitating capital formation.14
The Securities Acts also authorize a private right of action.15 Given
the dispersed ownership nature of most public corporations, class
actions are the most practical method for shareholders to bring securities
fraud claims.16 In fact, securities class actions are the largest category of
class actions17 and may be more effective at deterring and penalizing
securities law violations than SEC enforcement measures.18
Although effective, securities class actions have become highly
regulated and procedurally onerous.19 Class certification is one of the

14. See generally The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, Securities & Exchange
Commission, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
15. In the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 11, 12(a)(1), 12(a)(2), and 15 provide
for private rights of action, whereas the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides
for a private right of action in Section 18. See JAMES M. BARTOS, UNITED STATES
SECURITIES LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 182–83 (2d ed. 2002).
16. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The
aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary
response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government. Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional
framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons
may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”);
see also HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A LAWYER’S GUIDE
82 (2011).
17. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation
of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 323, 324 (2010) [hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Class Certification
Merits Trials].
18. See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities
Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison 28–39 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-002, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109739 (performing a regression analysis and finding that
SEC investigations may be less likely to have a deterrent effect than securities class
actions because class actions have a higher incidence and magnitude of settlements and
top officer resignation than do SEC investigations); see also Kaufman & Wunderlich,
Class Certification Merits Trials, supra note 17, at 323–24.
19. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, passed by Congress in 1995,
requires qualification of lead plaintiffs, heightened pleading standards, and sanctions
for abusive litigation in federal securities class actions. See Nicholas I. Porritt, Current
Trends in Securities Litigation: How Companies and Counsel Should Respond, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW 77, 82–83 (Michaela Falls ed. 2010). In
addition to PSLRA’s increased burdens, federal courts have begun to treat a motion for
class certification into a mini-trial where plaintiffs are required to prove the merits of
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first procedural obstacles to commencing a class action and can often
make or break a case.20 Since the adoption of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal case law has substantially increased
the burdens putative classes must meet to have the class certified.21 In
the event that certification is denied, individual plaintiffs may file
individual claims or attempt to intervene as lead plaintiff to gain
certification. 22 Once certification is denied, however, statutes of
limitations resume running.23
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme Court
held that statutes of limitations toll while a class seeks certification.24
The decision highlighted Rule 23’s interest in preventing multiple
individual suits where class action would be a fair and more efficient
alternative for adjudication. 25 The Court has not extended American
Pipe tolling to statutes of repose, however, and the two circuit courts
that have considered the issue have come to different conclusions.26 In
2000, the Tenth Circuit held that the three-year statute of repose in
Section 13 of the 1933 Act tolls during the class certification process in

the case. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Class Certification Merits Trials, supra note 17,
at 330–43.
20. Dwight J. Davis et. al, Expert Opinion in Class Certifications: Second Circuit
Revisits, Disavows In Re Visa Check and Joins Majority Rule, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 253,
253 (2007) (“Once a case is certified, an overwhelming majority of the cases go on to
settlements, many with large monetary recoveries. On the other hand, those cases that
do not survive class certification are typically dismissed . . . .”).
21. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities
Law Symposium: The Future of Class Actions: The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 729 (2013).
22. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983).
23. See id. at 354.
24. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
25. Id. at 551 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)(3)).
26. Compare Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
three-year statute of repose in securities class action suits toll during the class
certification process), with Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS,
Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that for securities class action suits, the threeyear statute of repose does not toll during the certification of the class). On November
22, 2013, an investor in IndyMac MBS, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
asking the United States Supreme Court to decide whether the statute of repose
governing securities law claims is tolled while class-action proceedings are pending.
IndyMac Investor Asks Supreme Court to Review Tolling of Statute of Repose, 20 No.4
WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 7, at *1 (Jan. 17, 2014).
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securities class actions. 27 This past summer, however, the Second
Circuit held that the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 does not
toll during class certification for securities class actions.28 This Note
analyzes the current circuit split and suggests a resolution to prevent
procedural mechanisms from precluding otherwise viable claims.
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the procedural
mechanisms at issue: statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, and class
actions, while highlighting factors specific to claims made pursuant to
the Securities Acts.
Part II then examines the circuit courts’
interpretation of American Pipe tolling and its application to Section
13’s statute of repose during class certification, while highlighting ways
in which lower courts have developed the doctrine. Lastly, Part III
concurs with the Second Circuit and argues that the statute of repose
should not toll while a class awaits certification, but relies on a different
rationale. This Note argues that simply interpreting the language of
Section 13 of the 1933 Act and Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
is sufficient to show that Congress did not intend for the statutes of
repose to be extended. To prevent process from overriding substance,
however, this Note advocates for legislative action creating an exception
to the statutes of repose in Section 13 and Section 804, allowing the
statute of repose to toll exclusively during class certification for
securities fraud class actions commenced within the statute of
limitations.
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, STATUTES OF REPOSE, AND CLASS
ACTIONS
Although distinct, statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are
often confused.29 Both Congress and the courts have compounded this
confusion by referring to the statute of repose as a statute of
limitations. 30 Section A discusses statutes of limitations and repose,
while Section B addresses class actions and provides an overview of
class action adjudication in securities fraud claims.

27.
28.
29.

Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1168.
IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 112–13.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Ams. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2013)
(citing Massachusetts v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88
(2d Cir. 2010)).
30. See id. at 143 nn.3–4.
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A. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE
Sub-section 1 discusses statutes of limitations and the federal
equitable tolling doctrine, while Sub-section 2 focuses on statutes of
repose. In Sub-section 3, this Note compares and contrasts statutes of
limitations and repose, while Sub-section 4 looks at the public policy
justifications for limitation periods. Sub-section 5 discusses the statutes
of limitations and repose specific to securities fraud claims.
1. Statutes of Limitations and Equitable Tolling
Statutes of limitations do not destroy a plaintiff’s right. 31 They
simply withhold the remedy. 32 Failure to bring a claim within the
limitations period creates a legal presumption that the plaintiff has no
legal rights. 33 Courts, however, can exercise their discretion and toll
statutes of limitations, allowing plaintiffs to pursue untimely claims.34
The federal equitable tolling doctrine may be invoked where the federal
cause of action is based on fraud, where the federal causes of action
have been concealed by the tortfeasor, and in cases where the plaintiff
was induced not to take legal action based on the defendant’s
statements.35 If applicable, the federal equitable tolling doctrine tolls the
applicable limitations period until the plaintiff discovers, or would have
discovered with due diligence, the fraud or the fraudulent concealment.36

31. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 725–26 (1988) (citing Little v. Blunt,
26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830)).
32. See id.
33. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348–49 (1944) (“The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free
of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”). United
States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299–300 (1922).
34. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 221 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen none of the reasons on which the statute is founded can possibly
apply, the federal courts have exercised equitable discretion to suspend the running of a
limitations period in conformity with the policy underlying the statute of limitations.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557–59 (1974) (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S.
424 (1965)); LeCroy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Ark.
1984).
35. See LeCroy, 585 F.Supp. at 758 n.1.
36. See id. at 758.
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While application of the equitable tolling doctrine must be applied on a
case-by-case basis after a thorough factual analysis, courts uniformly
apply the doctrine to toll the one-year statute of limitations in Section 13
of the 1933 Act.37
2. Statutes of Repose
In contrast, statutes of repose demarcate a period in which a
plaintiff must place a defendant on notice of his or her claim, regardless
of whether the plaintiff himself is aware that he has suffered an injury.38
Once the specified time period has passed, statutes of repose completely
extinguish a cause of action.39 Hence, equitable tolling principles are
inconsistent with statutes of repose.40
3. The Practical Difference Between Statutes of Limitations and Repose
While statutes of limitations and repose both limit the time a
plaintiff has to bring their claims, statutes of limitations and repose have
different lengths and accrue at different times. 41 In cases alleging
securities fraud claims, the Supreme Court has held that the statue of
limitations does not begin running until the fraud is discovered or could
have been discovered with due diligence.42 Statutes of repose, however,
are generally longer and run from the date of the alleged wrongdoing.43
Consequently, the statute of repose may prevent a plaintiff’s claim

37. Id. (“Unquestionably, the equitable tolling doctrine applies in the context of
statutes of limitations under the federal securities laws.”).
38. See Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 177 (D. Mass. 2009).
39. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95,
106 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Massachusetts v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4. (2d Cir. 2010)).
40. IndyMac MBS, 721 F.3d at 106 (“[S]tatutes of repose affect the underlying
right, not just the remedy, and thus they run without interruption once the necessary
triggering event has occurred, even if equitable considerations would warrant tolling . . .
.”) (citations omitted).
41. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1558.
42. See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010) (“The limitations
period . . . begins to run once the plaintiff did discover or a reasonably diligent plaintiff
would have discovered the facts constituting the violation—whichever comes first.”)
(internal citations omitted).
43. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361
(1991) (holding that a uniform federal statutory time bar to federal security fraud claims
was preferable to the states applying their own limitations periods).
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before she even realizes that a cause of action exists.44 In such cases, the
statute of repose prevents what otherwise could have been a cause of
action from ever manifesting.45 Thus, a defendant who can successfully
conceal his fraudulent actions until the statute of repose runs can
completely escape liability and leave injured parties with no legal
recourse.
4. Policy Justifications for Limitation Periods.
Statutory time bars aim to strike a balance between the competing
fundamental values of repose for defendants and vindication of the
plaintiff’s underlying claim.46 Both statutes of limitations and statutes
of repose function to bar stale claims. 47 The stale claim rationale
encourages plaintiffs to file their claims in a timely manner so that
defendants are not unduly burdened with presenting a defense with stale
evidence.48 Thus, a plaintiff may not idly sit on their rights. Rather, a
plaintiff must perform due diligence and investigate whether they have a
viable cause of action before the applicable time bar runs out. Statutory
time bars can also promote judicial efficiency by clearing dockets of
stale claims and freeing scarce judicial resources.49
44.
45.
46.
47.

See P. Stolz Family P’ship v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 103 (citing Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199 (1972)).
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 174 (D. Mass. 2008)
(“Statutes of limitations serve to ‘ensure essential fairness to defendants and to bar a
plaintiff who has slept on his rights.’”) (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974) (alterations omitted)); see also Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S.
55, 62 (1902) (“Every government . . . is not bound to keep its courts open indefinitely
for one who neglects or refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that
the means by which the other party might disprove his claim are lost in the lapse of
time.”) (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 44 (2011)).
48. Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1551 n.3
(“The stale evidence rationale is rooted in the premise that resolving claims on their
merits is more likely if the evidence, including testimony based on recall, is produced
closer in time to the event that gives rise to the claim.”); see also John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (“Most statutes of limitations
seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims.”); Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944).
49. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1551 n.3
(“The. . . statute of limitations promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial
resources, [and] safeguards the accuracy of . . . judgments by requiring resolution . . .
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While statutes of repose appear to be harsh arbitrary cut-offs
incentivizing defendants to conceal their violations, they represent a
legislative compromise balancing various interests. 50 Legislatures at
both the state and federal level have implemented statutes of repose to
limit a defendant’s liability in furtherance of economic goals, such as
keeping insurance premiums down and limiting the perpetual liability of
manufacturers.51 Limitation periods concerned with keeping insurance
premium costs low seek to redress the increasing costs for medical
malpractice insurance and the reluctance of insurance underwriters to
underwrite medical professionals and ultimately are motivated by an
interest in increasing the availability of quality health care options. 52
Alternatively, limiting manufacturer liability can increase the
availability of affordable product liability insurance and thereby lower
the price consumers’ pay for products. 53 A possible justification for
statutes of repose in securities law is the economic effect of reduced
litigation costs for corporations. Litigation costs are ultimately passed
down to the shareholders in the form of decreased stock values or
decreased dividends. 54 Thus, while statutes of repose might preclude
some shareholders from adjudicating their otherwise viable securities
fraud claims, they may protect shareholders’ economic interests by
reducing the potential costs imposed on their investments.
5. Statutes of Limitations and Repose in Securities Law
The majority of claims in securities class actions are brought
pursuant to Rule 10b-555 and Section 10(b)56 of the 1934 Act.57 While
while the record is fresh.”) (quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06
(2006)).
50. Garris Ference, Statutes of Repose and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10888, 10894
(2006) (“[L]imiting the time within which actions may be brought has in numerous
cases been held to be a rational, nonarbitrary means of achieving economic ends.”)
(quoting Wayne v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 403 (5th Cir. 1984)).
51. See id.; see also Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 631 F. Supp.
1144, 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
52. See Ference, supra note 50, at 10894.
53. See Spence v. Miles Lab., 810 F. Supp. 952, 963 (E.D. Tenn. 1992).
54. Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1606
(“[S]cholars suggest that the costs of securities class actions—both the settlement and
the litigation expenses of both sides—fall largely on the defendant corporation, and so
its shareholders ultimately bear these costs indirectly.”).
55.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 do not specify limitation periods within
which claims must be brought, the Supreme Court has held that the
limitation periods in Section 13 of the 1933 Act58 extend to claims made

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
56.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b)
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
57. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILING: 2012 YEAR IN
REVIEW 1 (2013) (“In 2012, 85 percent of filings made Rule 10b-5 claims, whereas only
10 percent and 9 percent made Section 11 or Section 12(2) claims, respectively.”),
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2012_YIR/
Cornerstone_Research_Securities_Class_Action_Filings_2012_YIR.pdf.
58.
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under
section 11 or section 12(a)(2) . . . unless brought within one year
after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after
such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under
section 12(a)(1) . . ., unless brought within one year after the
violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be
brought to enforce a liability created under section 11 or section
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pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 under the 1934 Act, in
addition to claims arising under sections already specified in the 1933
Act, Sections 11, 12(a)(1), and 12(a)(2). 59 The limitation periods in
Section 13 have been described as “a statute of limitations framed by a
statute of repose.”60 They are “cumulative, not alternative.”61 Thus, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that their cause of action was filed within a
year of discovering the untrue statement or omission—or a year after
they should have discovered the mistake through due diligence—and
within three years after the security at issue was bona fide offered to the
public.62
On July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “SarbanesOxley Act”) was enacted. 63 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act effectively
extended time bars on private rights of action that involve “a claim of
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a
regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws.”64 According to
Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the enumerated claims must be
brought either within two years after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation, or five years after the violation took place.65
12(a)(1) . . . more than three years after the security was bona fide
offered to the public, or under section 12(a)(2) . . . more than three
years after the sale.
Section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
59. Lampf, Pelva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359
(1991).
60. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Sterlin v.
Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 1998)).
61. LeCroy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
62. See id.
63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §1658(b) (2012)).
64.
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory
requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined in section
3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(47)), may be brought not later than the earlier of – (1) 2 years
after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5
years after such violation.
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2012).
65. Id.
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Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act extended the statute of repose from three
years to five years.”66 However, the statutes of limitation and repose set
forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act cannot be applied retroactively to revive
claims extinguished prior to the Act’s effective date of July 30, 2002.67
Thus, a plaintiff asserting a claim pursuant to Section 10 under the
1934 Act or Sections 11, 12(a)(1), or 12(a)(2) under the 1933 Act must
file suit within a year of when they discover, or should have discovered,
the violation, but if the cause of action accrued after July 30, 2002, they
have two years under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.68 If the plaintiff does not
file suit within three years – or five years if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
applies – after the initial public offering or sale, the statute of repose
then bars their claims.69 Class actions, however, present a dilemma. If
an individual is a plaintiff, named or unnamed, in a class action filed
within the applicable statutes of limitations and repose, and class
certification is denied, then the individual’s subsequent efforts to
adjudicate his claims are at risk of being found untimely.70 While the
Supreme Court has held that statutes of limitations toll until the district
court’s denial of certification,71 the courts have yet to apply the same
tolling doctrine to statutes of repose.72 Thus, a plaintiff’s subsequent

66. Compare id., with Lampf, Pelva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350, 364 n.9 (1991). Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 applies to claims of
“fraud, deceit, manipulation or a contrivance in contravention” of the requirements of
the securities laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), courts only apply the limitations periods
therein for claims that require a showing of “scienter and motive to defraud.” See In re
Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that the
extended limitations periods in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not apply to section 18
claims since they do not require plaintiffs to plead scienter. The court noted a general
consensus among district courts that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was only applicable to
claims requiring proof of intent as an element of the claim.).
67. Champion v. Homa, No. 3:03-CV-275-MEF, 2008 WL 8837534, at *12 (M.D.
Ala. Mar. 31, 2008) (citing six other circuits that have held that the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act’s statute of limitations cannot revive stale claims).
68. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 362–64; see also 28 U.S.C. §1658(b).
69. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 362–64; see also 28 U.S.C. §1658(b).
70. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553–54 (1974).
71. See id. at 552–54.
72. See Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d
95, 100 (2d Cir. 2013); see also IndyMac Investor Asks Supreme Court to Review
Tolling of Statute of Repose, 20 NO. 4 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 7, at *1 (Jan. 17,
2014).
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efforts may be time barred if they fall outside the three-year/five-year
statute of repose.73
B. CLASS ACTIONS
A federal class action is a legal construct meant to increase judicial
efficiency by avoiding the separate filing of similar claims. 74 Courts
must determine whether an action may be maintained as a class action as
soon as practicable after a person sues or is sued as a class
representative. 75 When determining if a class action is appropriate,
courts must verify that the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are met, specifically those outlined in Rule 23.76 Sub-section
1 outlines the threshold requirements a putative class must meet for
certification while Sub-section 2 discusses Rule 23(b) requiring that
class action be preferable to individual action. Sub-section 3 then
provides an overview of class action adjudication in securities law.
1. Rule 23(a): Getting over the Threshold
Rule 23(a) provides four threshold requirements for class
certification: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. 77 To meet Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement the
number of class members must be so large “that joinder of all members
is impractical.”78 The requirements of commonality and typicality focus
on the claims the class members assert.79 While commonality requires
that all putative class members present “questions of law or fact
common to the class,” typicality requires that all named class members
assert claims or defenses typical of the class as a whole.80 Finally, a

73.
74.

See IndyMac MBS, 721 F.3d at 109.
“A federal class action is no longer an invitation to joinder but a truly
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of
repetitious papers and motions.” Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550 (internal quotations
omitted).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(a).
76. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (quoting Miller v.
Mackey Int’l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971)).
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613
(1997).
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3).
80. See id.
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court must find that the named class members “fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.”81
2. Rule 23(b): Class Action Is Preferable to Individual Action
Once Rule 23(a) is satisfied, plaintiffs must demonstrate that class
action is preferable to individual class members pursuing their claims
separately.82 Plaintiffs seeking class certification contend that individual
actions may result in inconsistent adjudications and may establish
incompatible standards of conduct.83 Alternatively, a court may grant a
certification order if individual adjudication of the claims at hand
“would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.”84 A class action lawsuit may also be
certified in instances where a defendant “has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class” or where the court determines
“that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”85
Since Rule 23(f) was adopted in 1998, parties have been able to
challenge orders either denying or granting certification. 86
Consequently, a court of appeals may vacate a district court’s
certification order, so long as “the petition for permission to appeal is
filed . . . within 14 days after the order is entered.”87
3. Class Actions in Securities Law
In 1994, over 200 securities class actions were filed.88 In an effort
to reign in securities litigation, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) and the Securities Litigation

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)–(3).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) and advisory committee’s note.
See id.
RICHARD PAINTER, MEGAN FARRELL & SCOTT ADKINS, FEDERALIST SOC’Y L. &
PUB. POL’Y STUD., PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT: A POST-ENRON
ANALYSIS 3–4 (2002), available at http://fedsoc.server326.com/pdf/
PSLRAFINALII.PDF.
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Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).89 The PSLRA applies to
securities claims brought in federal court.90 It added Section 27 of the
1933 Act and Section 21D of the 1934 Act.91 The PSLRA aimed to
decrease frivolous securities class actions by requiring qualification of
the lead plaintiff, limiting attorney’s fees, restricting pre-trial discovery,
providing sanctions for frivolous lawsuits, and increasing pleading
requirements so that plaintiffs must allege, with particularity, “facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.”92 While the PSLRA was enacted to preclude
plaintiffs from filing frivolous securities class actions, studies indicate
that the law did not actually chill litigation.93 At first, PSLRA seemed to
fulfill Congress’ desired effect. The number of securities class actions
filed following PSLRA’s enactment dropped from approximately 191 in
1995 to approximately 119 in 1996. 94 This trend reversed soon
thereafter. In 1997, approximately 174 securities class actions were
filed.95
Since the PSLRA governs securities claims in federal court,
plaintiffs sought to side-step PSLRA’s additional hurdles by filing their
securities fraud claims in state court. 96 Through SLUSA, Congress
established a uniform set of procedural and substantive restrictions that
would govern all securities fraud class action claims.97 SLUSA prevents
forum shopping by requireing all class action claimants alleging fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities to file in federal
court. 98 Plaintiffs that fail to comply with SLUSA risk having their
claims precluded. 99 For example, if a plaintiff files a state-law class
action alleging misconduct covered by SLUSA in federal court, the
defendant can move to dismiss the action, and the court must grant the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 9, at 76.
See id.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 83; BARTOS, supra note 15, at 225.
See BARTOS, supra note 15, at 225.
See generally PAINTER, FARRELL & ADKINS, supra note 88 (providing a
statistical analysis of securities class action filings since PSLRA’s enactment).
94. Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon C. Mazumdar, & Atulya Sarin, Securities Class Action
Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1003 (2003).
95. Federal Securities Class Action Litigation 1996-YTD, STANFORD LAW,
http://securities.stanford.edu/charts.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
96. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 84.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. John M. Wunderlich, “Uniform” Standards for Securities Class Actions, 80
TENN. L. REV. 167, 168 (2012).
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motion.100 Alternatively, if a plaintiff files a state-law class action claim
covered by SLUSA in state court, the defendant may remove the action
to federal court.101 Once the SLUSA claim is properly in federal court,
the defendant can move for dismissal and the court must grant the
motion.102
II. A REVIEW OF AMERICAN PIPE AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE
CIRCUIT COURTS
Part II of this Note reviews American Pipe tolling and explores the
current circuit split between the Second and Tenth Circuits on whether
or not American Pipe tolling can apply to the statute of repose in
securities fraud class action claims. Section A outlines American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah 103 and discusses the rationale behind the
court’s holding concerning the tolling doctrine. Section B outlines
Joseph v. Wiles,104 a Tenth Circuit case, which held that American Pipe
tolling applied to the statute of repose in securities fraud class action
lawsuits. Section C outlines Police and Fire Retirement Systems of City
of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.,105 a Second Circuit case, which held
that American Pipe tolling could not toll the statute of repose in
securities fraud class action lawsuits. This Part concludes with Section
D, which gives an overview of the implications of the Joseph and
IndyMac decisions.
A. AMERICAN PIPE & CONSTRUCTION CO. V. UTAH
Sub-section 1 describes the facts that gave rise to the American
Pipe tolling doctrine. Sub-section 2 discusses the Supreme Court’s
rationale behind the American Pipe tolling doctrine decision. Finally,
Sub-section 3 outlines developments to the American Pipe tolling
doctrine.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 95 (10th Cir. 2000).
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95
(2d Cir. 2013).
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1. Background of the Case
American Pipe concerned antitrust claims brought by the state of
Utah on behalf of the public agencies of the state and local government
who were end-users of pipes sold by defendants, American Pipe &
Construction Co. (“American Pipe”) and other such distributors.106 On
March 10, 1964, American Pipe and others were indicted by a federal
grand jury for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 107 The
indictment alleged that the Defendants restrained trade by conspiring to
fix prices for the sale of steel and concrete pipes at auction and
distributing the proceeds among the parties. 108 The Defendants pled
nolo contendere to the allegations on June 19, 1964.109 On June 23, the
United States filed civil complaints in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California against the same Defendants which
resulted in a settlement.110
On May 13, 1969, eleven days before the expiration of the statute
of limitations, the State of Utah brought civil claims against American
Pipe in the United States District Court for the District of Utah pursuant
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act claiming that petitioners conspired to
illegally fix the prices of concrete and steel pipes.111 Subsequently, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation from Utah transferred the suit
to the United States District Court for the Central District of California
where the court held that the State did not meet the “numerosity”
requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) and thus the lawsuit could not be
maintained as a class action.112 On December 12, 1969, more than 60
towns, municipalities, and water districts in the State of Utah filed
motions with the Court to intervene in the State’s action.113 The district
court denied these motions finding them untimely since the limitations
period had run. 114 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
subsequently affirmed the district court’s decision to deny leave to
intervene as of right, but reversed the district court’s decision to deny

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 540.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 540–41.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 543–44.
Id. at 544.
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permissive intervention. 115 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether limitations periods toll for putative class members once
a class action has been filed.116
2. A New Tolling Doctrine Emerges
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held
that the commencement of a class action tolls the statute of limitations
for all timely intervenors.117 The Court emphasized Rule 23’s purpose
of promoting judicial efficiency and determined that to hold otherwise
would frustrate that purpose.118 The opinion noted that the statute of
limitations’ underlying policy of ensuring fairness to defendants was
preserved with the new tolling doctrine since commencement of the
initial class suit put defendants on notice of the substantive claims and
the number and generic identities of potential plaintiffs.119 Although the
new tolling doctrine expanded the court’s power to toll statutes of
limitations, the Supreme Court limited its holding to cases in which
class action status was denied due to a failure to satisfy the Rule 23(a)
numerosity requirement.120
3. Developments After American Pipe
In Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,121 the Supreme Court held
that American Pipe tolling extended to all asserted members of the
putative class and to non-class members who later file their own
independent actions, not simply intervenors. 122 The Crown Court

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 544–45.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 552–53.
462 U.S. 345 (1983).
See id. at 352. However, the Circuit Courts are divided on whether American
Pipe tolling applies to individuals who commence individual suits before the
certification issue is resolved in an impending class action. Compare State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that
American Pipe tolling applied to separate suits regardless of when they are filed), with
Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568 (6th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that “a plaintiff who chooses to file an independent action without waiting
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maintained that Rule 23 encourages class members to remain passive
and rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims. 123 Since
defendants are on notice as to the substantive claims and the number and
generic identities of potential plaintiffs, tolling the statute of limitations
for putative class members who do not seek intervention and individuals
filing independent claims does not create the unfair surprise that a
statute of limitations seeks to prevent.124 Thus, with respect to securities
fraud claims, filing a class action tolls the one-year statute of limitations
period under Section 13 and the two-year period under Section 804 if
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act controls for all putative class members during
class certification.125
In American Pipe, the Supreme Court clearly held that the relevant
statute of limitations tolls while the class awaits certification, however,
the Court did not specify when tolling would end.126 The Crown Court
held that tolling ends when class certification is denied.127 Recently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in the
event that a class certification order is vacated, the running of the
limitations periods resumes.128 Generally, voluntarily dismissed claims
are treated as though they never existed.129 However, some courts have
held that when a class action is voluntarily dismissed, American Pipe
tolling can be invoked when an amended complaint is filed.130
Although American Pipe tolling has been extended to claims
outside of the antitrust domain, lower courts have recognized certain
for a determination on the class certification issue” of an impending class action cannot
rely on American Pipe tolling).
123. Crown, 462 U.S. at 353.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 353–54; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553; see also In re Vivendi Universal,
S.A. Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that American Pipe tolling
applied to the two-year statute of limitations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
126. See generally Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. 538.
127. See Crown, 462 U.S. at 354.
128. Hall v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 727 F.3d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 2013)
(finding that vacated certification orders were essentially the same as decertification or
a denial of certification).
129. See In re Direxion Shares ETF Trust, 279 F.R.D. 221, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citation omitted).
130. Monroe Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. YPF Sociedad Anonima, No. 13 Civ. 842,
2013 WL 5548833, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2013) (quoting Sawyer v. Atlas Heating &
Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (E.D. Wis. 2010)). But see Direxion
Shares, 279 F.R.D. at 236 (holding that because voluntarily dismissed claims are
treated as though they do not exist, they cannot toll the statute of limitations.).
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limitations. For example, American Pipe tolling can only be invoked if
the plaintiff is bringing the same claims as those at issue in the original
class action.131 Similarly, plaintiffs cannot invoke American Pipe tolling
if they seek to bring an action against defendants who were not
defendants in the initial class action. 132 American Pipe tolling is
generally allowed in cases where an original named plaintiff does not
have standing. 133 However, where the named plaintiff clearly lacked
standing to the extent that no reasonable class member would have
relied on the filing of the class action, district courts may refuse to apply
American Pipe tolling.134
B. THE TENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH: JOSEPH V. WILES
In Joseph v. Wiles, the Tenth Circuit was the first United States
Court of Appeals to consider whether American Pipe tolling applied to
the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act.135 The
court’s decision distinguished the tolling in American Pipe from
equitable tolling and held that the three-year statute of repose in Section
131. See Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he pendency of a
previously filed class action does not toll the limitations period for additional class
actions by putative members of the original asserted class.”).
132. Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that American Pipe tolling of limitation periods against a defendant by class
action did not apply to a subsequent action against a different defendant, regardless of
whether the clams arose out of the same or a similar transaction); Champion v. Homa,
No. 3:03-CV-275-MEF, 2008 WL 8837534, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008) (“The
American Pipe doctrine is not without limits. First, only those defendants who were
parties to the original class action can be deemed to have had the requisite notice of the
claims asserted against them to be subject to the rule.”).
133. The Third Circuit has held that American Pipe tolling applies where the
original named plaintiff in the putative class lacked standing to pursue the claims. See
McKnowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 385, 389 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he class claims of intervening class members are tolled if a district court declines
to certify a class for reasons unrelated to the appropriateness of the substantive claims
for certification.”). The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit’s analysis in
Griffin v. Singletary. 17 F.3d 356, 360 (11th Cir. 1994).
134. In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F.Supp. 2d
650, 669–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“American Pipe ‘is predicated on the proposition that an
intervenor that reasonably expected to be represented in the originally filed action’
should be able to rely on the representatives to vindicate his rights.”) (quoting Trief v.
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 144 F.R.D. 193, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
135. See id.
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13 tolled during class certification. 136 Sub-section 1 gives a brief
overview of the facts giving rise to the Tenth Circuit’s decision while
Sub-section 2 discusses the Tenth Circuit’s rationale for extending
American Pipe tolling to Section 13’s statute of repose.
1. Background of the Case
Joseph concerned the public offering of convertible debentures by
MiniScribe Corporation, a manufacturer of computer hard disk drives.137
On May 21, 1987, MiniScribe made over $97 million in the public
offering.138 Subsequent to the public offering, Mr. Joseph purchased 250
of the debentures on the secondary market.139 Approximately two years
later, in March of 1989, MiniScribe announced that prior financial
statements could not be relied upon due to irregularities in its business
and accounting practices. 140 In June 1989, Mr. Joseph sold his
debentures at a loss of $17,000.141 In September 1989, an Independent
Evaluation Committee report revealed widespread intentional fraud at
MiniScribe resulting in material overstatements of revenues and
earnings. 142
By late 1989, MiniScribe filed for Chapter 11
143
bankruptcy.
As to be expected, a series of lawsuits ensued. Notably, on April 5,
1989, the first suit brought by debenture holders was filed as a class
action in the District Court of Colorado, asserting claims pursuant to
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.144 Several
other suits followed in various jurisdictions, with two suits of
importance to Mr. Joseph’s Tenth Circuit appeal. On May 9, 1989, a
suit was filed in California state court asserting state law claims as well
as claims under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of all
MiniScribe securities purchasers, but contained no named plaintiffs who
had purchased debentures.145 On November 1, 1989 the complaint was

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id. at 1157, 1158.
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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amended and claims under Section 11 were omitted.146 The second suit
of import to Mr. Joseph’s claims was filed October 4, 1989. The
October 4th suit, filed in a Colorado federal district court, asserted
claims pursuant to Section 10(b) and Section 11 on behalf of common
stock and debenture purchasers. 147 At a hearing on the motions to
certify classes of shareholders and debenture purchasers, the district
court held that it was not prepared to certify a debenture class in the
instant proceeding and allowed the debenture holders thirty days to file a
separate amended complaint. 148 Pursuant to the hearing, the district
court certified a shareholder-only class in a related action in October
1990.149
On August 10, 1990, a complaint was filed in California state court
with Mr. Joseph as a named plaintiff in this action.150 The complaint
asserted claims pursuant to Section 11 on behalf of all purchasers.151
Subsequently, the action was removed and transferred to federal district
court in Colorado, where Mr. Joseph moved to certify the class. 152
However, on October 24, 1991, the district court denied his motion on
the grounds that Mr. Joseph lacked standing to pursue a Section 11
claim as an after market purchaser and, alternatively, that the class
claims were barred by the statute of repose.153 The shareholder action
eventually settled in 1993.154 On June 3, 1994, the district court held a
hearing and ordered that remaining debenture purchasers file their
claims.155 Accordingly, on July 5, 1994, Mr. Joseph filed an amended
complaint asserting his Section 10(b) and Section 11 claims. 156
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the district
court granted the motion finding that the claims were untimely and the
allegations were insufficient for class certification. 157

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1157–58.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Mr. Joseph appealed to the Tenth Circuit.158 Most pertinent to this
Note was Mr. Joseph’s argument that his claims were timely because the
applicable limitations periods should toll while class certification was
pending.159
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Rationale
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district
court’s order and decision with respect to Mr. Joseph’s claims.160 The
issue of importance to this Note is the Tenth Circuit’s ruling with
regards to Mr. Joseph’s third argument: whether the statute of repose
tolls during class certification for claims filed pursuant to Section 11.
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Joseph’s Section 11
claim was timely because the applicable statute of repose in Section 13
of the 1933 Act tolls during class certification.161 Defendants argued
that precedent barred the court from applying equitable tolling principles
to the statute of repose. 162 However, the Tenth Circuit found their
arguments unavailing and distinguished equitable tolling from legal
tolling.163 While the Supreme Court has held that the statute of repose is
not subject to equitable tolling,164 the Court has not ruled as to whether
or not statutes of repose are subject to legal tolling.165 The Tenth Circuit
held that the tolling rule in American Pipe was a rule of legal tolling, not
equitable tolling, which allowed the court to apply American Pipe
tolling to the statute of repose in Section 13.166

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1166. The defendants cited Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991), and Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 939
F.2d 1420, 1434–35 (10th Cir. 1991).
163. For example, equitable tolling is appropriate where “the claimant has filed a
defective pleading during the statutory period . . . or where the plaintiff has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to
pass.” Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1166–68. On the other hand, “tolling that occurs any time an
action is commenced and class certification is pending” is legal tolling. Id.
164. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
165. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95,
100 (2d Cir. 2013).
166. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1166–68.
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In reaching this decision, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on the
American Pipe Court’s emphasis on Rule 23. 167 The court held that
tolling the statute of repose while a class is awaiting certification serves
Rule 23’s interests in judicial economy by eliminating the need for
potential class members to file individual claims to secure their
interests. 168 Furthermore, defendants were not unfairly prejudiced by
applying American Pipe tolling to the statute of repose since the
previous class actions put them on notice as to the substantive claims
and the general number and identities of the parties that brought them.169
Although the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit court to apply
American Pipe tolling to statutes of repose, district courts in other
circuits have heavily relied on Joseph to support applying American
Pipe tolling in the same context. In 2007, the Eastern District of
Wisconsin adopted the Joseph rationale and held that American Pipe
tolling applies to the three-year statute of repose in the Truth in Lending
Act.170 Two years later, in 2009, the First Circuit applied American Pipe
tolling to the statue of repose in an employee benefits case.171 In 2012,
the District of New Jersey agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
Joseph and tolled the three-year statute of repose for Section 10(b)
claims.172 Each of these courts adopted the Joseph Court’s distinction
between equitable tolling and legal tolling and held that American Pipe
tolling was legal tolling.173
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1167.
Id.
Id. at 1167–68.
Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 243 F.R.D. 313, 316–17 (E.D. Wis. 2007)
(holding that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of repose, serves the purposes of
Rule 23, and does not compromise the purposes of the three-year statute of repose
because defendants were on notice of the nature of the claim and the identity of
plaintiffs).
171. Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F.Supp. 2d 164, 177 (D. Mass 2009)
(holding that statutes of repose are meant to demarcate a set time frame in which a
plaintiff must place a defendant on notice and that American Pipe tolling “accomplishes
the exact same goal, rendering the statute of repose superfluous for the period of time
that the class action is pending”).
172. In re Merek & Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 180707, at *44 (D.N.J. Dec. 20,
2012).
173. See id. at *41–42; Andrews, 243 F.R.D. at 316–17; Arivella, 623 F.Supp. 2d at
177 (“The differences between the forms of tolling is crucial because the animating
principles of legal tolling are compatible with tolling a statute of repose, while the
reasoning behind equitable tolling is not.”).
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C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH: POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF DETROIT ET AL. V. INDYMAC MBS, INC.
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Joseph, this past
summer, the Second Circuit held that American Pipe tolling could not
apply to the three-year statute of repose in Section 13.174 In IndyMac
MBS, Inc., the lead plaintiff and putative class members brought claims
pursuant to Sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the 1933 Act.175 Allegedly, the
defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in over
100 various offerings regarding the sale of certain mortgage passthrough certificates under the related registration statements and
prospectus.176
1. Background of the Case
Two separate class action lawsuits were brought against defendants
in district court, one by the City of Detroit Police and Fire Retirement
System (“Detroit PFRS”) and one by the Wyoming State Treasurer and
the Wyoming Retirement System (jointly, “Wyoming”).177 The actions
were consolidated and Wyoming was appointed the lead plaintiff
pursuant to PSLRA.178 On June 21, 2010, the district court dismissed all
claims arising from offerings of securities that were not purchased by
Wyoming for lack of standing by the named Plaintiffs.179 Subsequently,
Detroit PFRS and other putative members of the class moved to
intervene in the action to assert their claims with respect to the
certificates not purchased by Wyoming.180 Even though the three-year
statute of repose had run its course, the intervenors argued that
American Pipe tolling should apply.181 In the event that American Pipe
tolling could not be invoked, the intervenors sought to have their claims
“relate back” to the initial action.182

174. Police and Fire Ret. Sys. of the City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d
95, 101 (2d Cir. 2013).
175. Id. at 101–02.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 102.
179. Id. at 103.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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The district court denied both motions, holding that American Pipe
tolling did not apply to the statute of repose and that relation back
pursuant to Rule 15(c) could not be employed to extend the statute of
repose.183 Three of the five intervenors appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit arguing that American Pipe
tolling should toll the applicable statute of repose. 184
2. The Second Circuit’s Rationale
The Second Circuit refused to extend American Pipe tolling to
Section 13’s statute of repose noting that only the legislature can create
an exception to a statute of repose. 185 The Second Circuit did not
characterize the tolling in American Pipe as equitable or legal as other
courts had when faced with the issue of applying the doctrine to statutes
of repose.186 The court saw no need to do so. If the tolling sanctioned in
American Pipe was a form of equitable tolling, then it could not apply to
statutes of repose. 187 The Second Circuit determined that statutes of
repose created a substantive right in defendants to be free of liability
after the time period Congress prescribed had passed.188 Since the Rules
Enabling Act dictates that general rules of practice and procedure “shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” 189 the Second
Circuit held that the tolling in American Pipe, largely based on the
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 106 (citing P. Stolz Family P’ship v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir.

2004)).
186. Id. at 107–09.
187. Id. at 109 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350, 363 (1991)).
188. Id. at 106 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472
(10th Cir. 1996).
189.
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect.
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §2072(a)–(b) (2012).
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judicial efficiency interests in Rule 23, could not extend to statutes of
repose, even if classified as legal tolling.190
Prior to the Second Circuit decision in IndyMac, other courts
refused to apply American Pipe tolling to the statute of repose, but relied
on a different rationale. One federal judge for the Southern District of
New York adopted a statutory interpretation approach and held that
American Pipe tolling could not be extended to Section 13’s statute of
repose because doing so would violate the plain language of Section
13.191 Another federal judge for the Southern District of New York also
previously held that American Pipe tolling was a form of equitable
tolling and thus inapplicable to the statute of repose.192
D. THE AFTERMATH
Currently, the Tenth and Second Circuits are the only United States
Courts of Appeals to rule as to whether or not American Pipe tolling
applies to the statute of repose. 193 Each circuit court highlighted
important policies in handing down their decisions.194 After weighing
Rule 23’s interest in judicial economy against a defendant’s interest in
fair notice of the claims brought against him and the generic number and
identities of the individuals bringing them, the Tenth Circuit held that
the statute of repose is tolled during class certification.195 By extending
American Pipe tolling to statutes of repose, the Joseph ruling increases a
plaintiff’s opportunities to adjudicate their securities fraud claims. 196
Resolving securities fraud claims on their merits—rather than
dismissing them on procedural grounds—furthers enforcement of the
securities laws and has a greater deterrent effect on violators.197 On the
190.
191.

IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 108.
Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“By the plain language of section 13, the three-year statute of repose
is absolute . . . . Simply put the words “[i]n no event” mean what they say.”) (citing
Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990)); In re Lehman
Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp 2d 477, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
192. Plumbers, Pipefitters & MES Local Union 392 v. Fairfax Fin. Holdings, Ltd.,
886 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
193. IndyMac Investor Asks Supreme Court to Review Tolling of Statute of Repose,
20 No. 4 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 7 at *2 (Jan. 17, 2014).
194. Cf. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 2000); IndyMac MBS, Inc.,
721 F.3d 95.
195. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1169.
196. Id. at 1166 (citing Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968)).
197. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 3, at 1608.
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other hand, the Second Circuit weighed a defendant’s substantive right
of repose against the Rule 23’s interests in judicial economy and
refrained from tolling the statute of repose during class certification.198
Refraining from tolling statutes of repose protects defendants from the
prospect of perpetual liability. 199 By enforcing statute of repose in
Section 13 as a cutoff, the IndyMac ruling may even prevent excessive
securities fraud litigation costs from being passed on to shareholders.200
III. AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION REJECTING PROCESS OVER SUBSTANCE
March 10, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the IndyMac MBS
investors’ petition for a writ of certiorari.201 Taking into consideration
the canons of statutory construction and issues of the separation of
powers, Section A of this Part discusses why courts should refrain from
extending American Pipe tolling to statutes of repose. Section B will
propose a legislative exception to the statute of repose for class actions
that satisfy the statute of limitations so that viable claims are not
precluded on procedural grounds. Section C demonstrates that state
courts have also refrained from tolling statutes of repose and that state
legislatures have created legislative exceptions to statutes of repose in
cases involving fraud.
A. COURTS SHOULD NOT APPLY AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING TO THE
STATUTES OF REPOSE IN SECTION 13 AND SECTION 804
Although the Tenth Circuit sought to enforce the judicial economy
concerns in American Pipe, the court should not have tolled the statute
of repose.202 Inconvenience or hardship cannot justify a departure from

198.
199.

IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 108.
See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled on other
grounds. See generally Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn.
1992).
200. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 3 at 1605–06 (“[S]cholars suggest that
the costs of securities class actions-both the settlement and the litigation expenses of
both sides-fall largely on the defendant corporation, and so its shareholders ultimately
bear these costs indirectly.”).
201. Public Empees.’ Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.,134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014).
202. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63 (1902) (“[W]hat shall be considered a
reasonable time [to bring claims] must be settled by the judgment of the legislature, and
the courts will not inquire into the wisdom of its decision in establishing the period of
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the plain language of the statute. 203 Thus, determining whether
American Pipe tolling is legal or equitable, or whether a defendant has a
substantive right to repose, is unnecessary. Courts should simply rely
on the plain language of the statute. This Note advocates that courts
adopt a statutory interpretation approach and find that American Pipe
tolling cannot apply to the statute of repose. Sub-sections 1 and 2
demonstrate that utilizing the tools of statutory interpretation preclude
courts from tolling the statutes of repose in securities fraud claims. Subsection 1 analyzes the plain language of Section 13 of the 1933 Act and
804 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Sub-section 2 employs the principle of
statutory construction that prohibits interpreting statutes in a way that
makes part of the statute superfluous or void. Sub-section 3 shows that,
aside from adhering to the correct statutory interpretation of Sections 13
and 804, courts should not toll the statutes of repose in securities fraud
class actions because the legislature intended for them to be a firm
deadline.
1. The Plain Language of Section 13 and Section 804 Precludes Courts
from Tolling the Statutes of Repose for Securities Fraud Class Actions
The first step in statutory interpretation is to look to the language of
the statute and determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning. 204 The language of the statute of repose in
Section 13 of the 1933 Act is clear. “In no event shall any such action
be brought to enforce a liability created under Section 11 or Section
12(a)(1) . . . more than three years after the security was bona fide
offered to the public.”205 The language in Section 804 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 is equally clear.206 The judiciary is not at liberty to
create an exception to an unambiguous legislative decree.207 To do so
legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a
denial of justice.”).
203. Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 324 (1889) (noting that the general rule is
the judiciary could not create an additional exception to the applicable statute of
limitations that was not among those already articulated in the statute).
204. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citing Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2012) (emphasis added).
206. Id. (“[M]ay be brought no later than . . .”) (emphasis added).
207. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95,
106 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] statute of repose is subject only to legislatively created
exceptions.”) (citing P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir.
2004)).
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would be judicial legislation.208 Courts are only granted the authority to
interpret legislative decrees and determine their constitutionality; they
cannot modify them at their discretion.209 The words “[i]n no event” in
Section 13 mean just that. 210 Since the language of Section 13 and
Section 804 is clear and unambiguous, judicial inquiry as to whether the
statute of repose can be tolled should end here.211
2. Tolling the Statutes of Repose in Securities Fraud Class Actions
Would Contravene Principles of Statutory Construction
Statutes should be interpreted so that so that each clause, sentence,
or word is meaningful.212 Applying American Pipe tolling to statutes of
repose would render the phrases “in no event”, in Section 13, and “not
later than”, in Section 804, void and insignificant. Furthermore, since
the one-year/two-year period is subject to equitable tolling principles,
any interpretation that does not consider the three-year period, in
Section 13, and the five-year period, in Section 804, an absolute

208. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 307–08 (1993) (“Adherence to
these restraints on judicial review preserves to the legislative branch its rightful
independence and its ability to function. The restraints have added force where a
legislature must engage in a process of line drawing . . .”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 85 (1987) (“Separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”);
see also Morgan v. Des Moines, 60 F. 208, 209 (8th Cir. 1894) (holding that the
judiciary could not import an exception to the statute of limitations that Congress did
not intend; “[t]o do so would be judicial legislation . . .”).
209. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our individual
appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of
an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process
comes to an end.”).
210. Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F. 2d 1385, 1391 (7th
Cir. 1990)).
211. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citing Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
212. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (stating that it is a “cardinal
principle of statutory construction” that a statute should be interpreted so that “no
clause, sentence, or word [is] superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (quoting Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotations omitted)).
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limitation would make the language outlining those limitation periods
superfluous.213
3. Inquiry into the Legislative Intent Precludes Court from Tolling
Statutes of Repose in Securities Fraud Class Actions
In the event a statute’s language is ambiguous, the inquiry turns to
the congressional intent.214 To determine congressional intent, the court
must look to the policies underlying the limitation periods. 215 The
language of Section 13 and Section 804 is clear and unambiguous.216
However, it is apparent Congress intended for the statutes of repose to
completely extinguish a plaintiff’s claim. 217 The Tenth Circuit erred
when it examined the purpose of Rule 23 to determine if tolling should
be permitted rather than Congress’ purpose for creating the three-year
statute of repose.218 The Second Circuit correctly found that Congress
intended the three-year period in Section 13 to be an absolute
limitation.219 Senate and House conference reports reveal Congress was
dissatisfied with the limitations periods in Section 13, but was wary of

213. Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 664 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1981) (
“Otherwise [Section 13] would create a limitation period for all suits of one year from
the time discovery of the untrue statements or omissions should have been made, and
the three year provision would serve no purpose at all.”) (internal quotation omitted).
214. See United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
215. Burnett v. N.Y.C. Ry. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965).
216. Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624,
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391
(7th Cir. 1990)).
217. S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 24 (2002); 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-02 (daily ed. July
25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); 148 Cong. Rec. S7350-04 (daily ed. July
25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
218. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95,
107 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Lampf noted that Section 13’s three-year
limitation is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling and reiterated that the purpose
of the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutoff.”) (internal citations omitted).
219. Id.; see Maxwell v. LaBrunerie, 731 F. Supp. 358, 361 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (citing
Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982));
Armbrister v. Roland Int’l Corp., 667 F. Supp. 802, 823 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Antinore v.
Alexander & Alexander Servs., 597 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (D. Minn. 1984) (citing Engl
v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1981) and Turner v. First Wis. Mortg. Trust,
454 F. Supp. 899, 911 (E.D. Wis. 1978)); Brick v. Dominion Mortg. & Realty Trust,
442 F. Supp. 283, 289–91 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Cowsar v. Reg’l Recreation, Inc., 65
F.D.R. 394, 397 (M.D. La. 1974).
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the potential for abusive litigation.220 The Senate explicitly noted that
the five-year statute of repose in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should not be
subject to equitable tolling. 221 Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
extension, Congress failed to extend the statute of limitations when
passing PLSRA and SLUSA despite a noted dissatisfaction with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf v. Gilbertson to create the current
one-year limitations and three-year repose periods for securities fraud
claims.222 Congress’s reluctance to alter the limitations periods in place
prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley extension, coupled with the concern for
abusive litigation, evinces the legislature’s interest in creating an
absolute bar to untimely claims rather than allowing all viable claims to
be adjudicated.223
B. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE SECURITIES ACTS TO CREATE AN
EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTES OF REPOSE IN SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS
ACTIONS
This Note calls for congressional action to rectify the procedural
impediments plaintiffs face when opting to bring their securities fraud
claims in a class action. Congress should create an exception to the
statutes of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act and Section 804 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to permit American Pipe tolling while a class
awaits certification. Sub-section 1 gives an example of a current
legislative exception to a statute of repose while Sub-section 2 explains
why an exception to the statute of repose is the most effective option for
remedying procedural impediments to securities fraud class actions.

220. See 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-02 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Jackson-Lee) and 148 Cong. Rec. S7350-04 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Gramm).
221. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 24 (2002).
222. S. REP. No. 105-182 16–17, 19 (1998) (noting that the PSLRA’s failure to
extend the statute of limitations applicable to securities fraud cases was one of its
shortcomings).
223. See S. REP. No. 105-182 at 16–17, 19 (1998); see also 148 Cong. Rec. H546202 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); 148 Cong. Rec. S7350-04
(daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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1. The Statute of Repose Exception in GARA
In the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”),224
Congress provided for four exceptions to GARA’s 18-year statute of
repose: the fraud exception, the medical emergency exception, the not
aboard the aircraft exception, and the written warranty exception.225 In
practice, the fraud exception is GARA’s most litigated exception. 226
While objectors argue that GARA and the Securities Acts are not
analogous, Congress enacted both with policies geared towards
protecting public consumers. 227 GARA seeks to protect the public
interests by regulating small commercial airlines, 228 while Congress
implemented the securities acts to offer shareholders greater protections
in the pre-reform securities market.229
2. A Statutory Exception is the Most Efficient Solution to Overcoming
Procedural Obstacles to Viable Claims
Statutory exceptions to statutes of repose allow plaintiffs greater
opportunities to adjudicate their claims. Thus, a statutory exception to
the statute of repose for securities fraud cases would further the purpose
of the Securities Acts and shareholder protection through regulation and
agency oversight. An exception similar to the GARA misrepresentation
exception would not prejudice defendants with the unfair surprises
224. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552.
225. See id.; see also Franklin F. Bass & Robert Modica, The General Aviation
Revitalization Act: A BriefOoverview, WILSON ELSER (2006), available at
http://www.wilsonelser.com/files/repository/GARA_April2006.pdf.
226. See Bass & Modica, supra note 226.
227. See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (2012).
228.

The Secretary of Transportation must consider factors such as the
public interests in:
(4) the availability of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient, and low-priced services
without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or deceptive practices . . . (7) developing
and maintaining a sound regulatory system that is responsive to the needs of the public
. . . (9) preventing unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive practices in air
transportation . . .
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2012).
229. See FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 9, at 1; Aguilar, supra note 10.
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statutes of repose aim to avoid. 230 Prior class actions dismissed on
procedural grounds put defendants on notice as to the number and
generic identities of possible plaintiffs and the claims they are likely to
bring.231 Since plaintiffs must still satisfy the one/two year statutes of
limitations, a class action exception to the statute of repose would not
give plaintiffs free reign to pursue stale claims and expose defendants to
perpetual liability.232
While others may advocate an extension of the statutes of repose,
such a compromise would not suffice. Admittedly, an extension would
likely allow more individuals to bring claims after class certification is
denied. However, it would not extend the same opportunity to all
shareholders that creating a statutory class action exception would. A
congressional amendment allowing an exception to the statutes of
repose for class action securities fraud claims would provide a brightline rule for district courts and courts of appeals satisfying a defendant’s
interest in fair and timely notice and a plaintiff’s interest in a fair
opportunity to vindicate his rights.
C. STATE COURT AND LEGISLATIVE EXAMPLES
Although securities fraud claims are within the jurisdiction of
federal courts, a look at state court decisions indicates that state courts
have routinely refused to toll statutes of repose. To avoid viable claims
230. GARA’s fraud exception to its 18-year statute of repose allows claimants who
plead:

with specificity the facts necessary to prove, and proves, that the
manufacturer with respect to a type certificate or airworthiness
certificate for, or obligations with respect to continuing
airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component, system, subassembly,
or other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal
Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal
Aviation Administration, required information that is material and
relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such
aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is
causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered . .
..
49 U.S.C. § 40101.
231. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000).
232. See Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974).
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from being precluded on procedural grounds, state legislatures have
carved out exceptions to statutes of repose, especially in claims
involving fraudulent behavior by defendants. Sub-section 1 of this
Section outlines state cases where the court refused to toll the statute of
repose. Sub-section 2 gives examples of various state legislative
exceptions to statutes of repose.
1. State Courts Refuse to Toll Statutes of Repose
State supreme courts refuse to toll statutes of repose, even in cases
where defendants have committed fraud. In Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd.
Partnership, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that filing a motion for
class certification in securities fraud claims does not toll the statute of
repose for individual class members. 233 State courts also typically
refrain from tolling statutes of repose in fields outside of securities
regulation. For example, Arkansas has refrained from applying the
state’s “repair” tolling doctrine to the five-year statute of repose for
claims arising from defective construction, even in cases where the
defendant fraudulently concealed the defective construction. 234 In
declining to toll statutes of repose, the states have recognized that the
judiciary’s duty is to apply the law as it is, and not as they believe it
should be.235
2. State Legislatures Provide Exceptions to Statutes of Repose in Claims
233. Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 254 P.3d 360 (D. Ariz. 2011). Initially, the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that Arizona’s statute of
repose barred the plaintiff’s claim. Id. The plaintiff appealed and the Ninth Circuit
certified the question to the Supreme Court of Arizona. Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd.
P’ship, 634 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2011).
234. First Electric Coop. Corp. v. Black, Corley, Owens & Hughs, P.A., 2011 Ark.
App. 447, at *4 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[O]ur supreme court has identified the five-yearlimitations period in section 16-56-112(a) as a statute of repose. A statute of repose . . .
is an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any
reason. . .”) (internal citations omitted)).
235. See id. at *4–5 (“[The] supreme court has consistently refused to graft
judicially created exceptions onto the statute of repose . . . we are hesitant to impose on
[the statute of repose] any construction not warranted by its own clear terms.”);
Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 709 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. 2011) (affirming the lower
court’s decision to grant summary judgment and holding that the statute of repose
cannot be tolled, even in cases where plaintiffs allege the defendant fraudulently
concealed a defect in the construction of their patio and the plaintiff was injured after
the statute of repose had passed).
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Involving Fraud
States legislatures have also sought to remedy the harsh results of
statutes of repose in fraud cases by carving out statutory exemptions to
statutes of repose for specific claims, such as claims of fraud, intentional
misrepresentation, or gross negligence.236 In Tennessee, for example,
the legislature created an exception to the statute of repose for health
care liability actions.237 The statute of repose can toll in actions where
the statute of limitations has been satisfied and the defendant
fraudulently concealed his violation. 238 Similarly, the Minnesota
legislature has provided an exception to the ten-year statute of repose for
injury claims arising from construction services when fraud is
involved. 239 In Arizona, the legislature included an exception to the
twelve-year statute of repose in product liability cases where the cause
of action is based on the manufacturer or seller’s negligence or a breach
of express warranty. 240 Mississippi’s legislature adopted a broad
exception to limitation periods in cases where the defendant fraudulently
concealed the cause of action.241 Since most state statutory exceptions
require fraudulent action or concealment by defendants, state exceptions
236. See Alan R. Levy, Buckley & Curtis, Limited Respite is Found in Statutes of
Repose,
in
FOR
THE
DEFENSE
(2010),
available
at
http://buckleyandcurtis.com/articles/levy-articles/dri-repose-article.pdf.
237. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (2014).
238. Id.
239. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (2014).
240. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §12-551 (2014). Similarly, Colorado has a legislative
exception for products liability claims where injuries were caused by hidden defects or
prolonged exposure to hazardous materials, or if the manufacturer, seller, or lessor
intentionally misrepresented or fraudulently concealed material facts regarding the
product that proximately caused the injury. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-107
(2014).
241.

If a person liable to any personal action shall fraudulently conceal
the cause of action from the knowledge of the person entitled
thereto, the cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at,
and not before, the time at which such fraud shall be, or with
reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered.
MISS. CODE ANN. §15-1-67 (2014). The Mississippi statute has been held to extend to
statutes of repose. See Windham v. Latco of Miss., Inc., 972 So. 2d 608, 613–14 (Miss.
2008).
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to statutes of repose evince a concern for inequitable results that allow
defendants to escape liability while injured plaintiffs are left with no
legal recourse.242
CONCLUSION
While the statute of repose for securities fraud claims precludes
meritorious class action claims from adjudication, the judiciary should
not be the branch to create an exception for securities class actions. The
plain language of Section 13 and Section 804’s statutes of repose is clear
and Congress’s intent is apparent: the judiciary cannot exercise its
discretion to toll the statute of repose during class certification. 243
Therefore, this Note encourages Congress to amend the 1933 Act and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and create an exception to the statutes of repose
for securities fraud class actions allowing American Pipe tolling in cases
where the initial class action was filed within the statute of
limitations.244 Such an exception would satisfy a defendant’s right to
fair notice of the plaintiffs and their claims and their interest in avoiding
perpetual liability while protecting a plaintiff’s right to pursue legal
recourse in a timely manner.245

242.
243.

See Windham, 972 So. 2d 608.
See Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624,
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391
(7th Cir. 1990)); see also Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS,
Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).
244. See supra Part III.B.
245. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974).

